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This study assesses the proposition that politicisation of public 
sector employment leads to government managers moving away 
from neutrality values and adopting responsive values. Results of a 
survey of well over 100 councillors in the New Zealand local 
government system provided limited support to this proposition. 
Most councillors report managers adopting neutrality values and 
combining them with elements from trustee and responsive value 
types in the area of managerial advice. We argue that although 
most managers accept the traditional role distribution between 
councillors and managers a small percentage of managers tend to 
believe that managers have an obligation to ensure that their view 




In most democratic governments, more specifically in the countries 
following the Westminster constitutional system, efforts have been 
made to ensure that government managers maintain independence 
in their behaviour. Politicians have been kept out of the 
employment matters of government managers in the belief that 
politicisation of government employment compromises the 
independence of government managers. The assumption is that a 
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government manager must be in a position to give “advice and 
counsel … in a fearless and frank way” and this can only be achieved 
by that person being a career civil servant who cannot be sacked for 
giving such advice in the event that the minister disagrees with it or 
does not like it’ (Baxter, 1991, 280). Kimber et al, (2003, 63) 
elaborates: “By eroding senior public servants” tenure and 
increasing politicisation, making the position of senior officers 
personally dependent on the favour of ministers, those 
restructuring the public service could have compromised the 
conditions that enable public servants to provide ministers with 
impartial advice in a “frank and fearless” manner’.  Tony Ayers, a 
former Head of the Department of Defence, Commonwealth 
Government, states that public managers are “paid to give ministers 
the advice they ought to hear and not what they wanted to hear 
and that the risk was that when people believed they could be 
sacked without any apparent reason and without need, they tend to 
get the advice ministers want to hear” (Windsor, 1996).   
 
There are at least two fundamental flaws with these clams. One is 
conceptual and the other is empirical. The meaning of 
‘politicisation’ is not clear nor is that of ‘frank and fearless advice’. 
Does it mean government managers act as the unelected trustees 
of the public? When Tony Ayers claims that ruling politicians ‘get 
what they want to hear’ does he mean government managers 
under a politicised employment relationship would adopt 
‘responsive’ behaviour?  It is important that the concepts employed 
have clarity, are distinguished from one another and are used 
consistently. Second, there is hardly any empirical evidence to 
support the claim that under a non-politicised employment 
relationship government managers provide ‘frank and fearless’ 
advice.  Haidar & Spooner (2007) asked government managers 
about these questions and reported on their behaviours under a 
politicised employment condition. This study asks politicians about 
the possible politicisation of government managers’ employment 
and the values government managers adopt.  It asks about political 
influence on the employment matters of government managers, the 
managerial values they experience and ones they prefer.  
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The paper begins with a discussion of the legal aspects of local 
government and follows it up with a discussion of the brief history 
of local government in New Zealand. The method of data collection 
is then discussed and, finally, the results and findings of the study 
are presented. This study is one of the first attempts to survey 
politicians about the employment matters and the values of 
appointed managers (see Lee, 2001).  
 
Local Government in New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand (NZ), local authorities are creatures of statutes. 
They owe their origin, either individually or a as a class, to an Act of 
Parliament. Legally, individual local government units are like 
statutory incorporations (Bush, 1980, 111). The generic term ‘the 
council’ is commonly used in two meanings. In its broader definition 
a council means the institution and includes elected members, staff, 
resources, facilities, territory and so forth. In the second meaning a 
council refers to the elected members, which is governing body. 
Elected members are the council and are the fount of all legal 
authority. “Sovereignty rests with the elected members. Elected 
members as the council are answerable for their actions to the 
public and in a court of law (Bush, 1980, 132).  
 
History and Origin 
New Zealand operates under a two tier system of government: 
Central government and local government. One of the most 
comprehensive reviews of sub-national governments, including 
local government, was initiated by the Labour Government in 1987 
and resulted, among other things, in a more rigid demarcation 
between management and elected members (Anderson & 
Norgrove, 1997, 149). The councillors’ role was explicitly limited to 
policy formulation, budgetary control and performance monitoring. 
The chief executive officer, responsible to the councillors, was to be 
the council’s only direct employee and in turn the employer of the 
remaining staff on the council’s staff. He or she must be appointed 
under a contract (capable of being renewed for a further two years) 
for a term no longer than five years” (Anderson & Norgrove, 1997, 
118). 
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The Local Government Act 2002 (LGA 2002) by and large carries 
forward reforms introduced in the late 1980s. The LGA 2002 also 
makes a clear distinction between the duties and responsibilities of 
elected members (EM) and appointed managers (AM) in the area of 
the employment relationship of AMs. Under the current Act, EMs 
appoint a Chief Executive (CE) (s. 42, 1). CEs are appointed on 
performance contracts which are limited to no more than five years, 
with a two year extension if the CE applies for and succeeds in a 
statutorily defined review process (Schedule 7, section 34). A CE in 
turn is responsible, among others, for “employing, on behalf of local 
authority, the staff of the local authority (s42, g); and negotiating 
the terms of employment of the staff of the local authority (s42, h).  
 
Research design and conceptual framework 
 
This study focuses on two research questions: Whether the 
employment relationship of NZ AMs is politicised and what values 
guide the behaviour of AMs while they carry our council work.  In 
order to examine the values AMs adopt in their relationship with 
councillors,  we have identified three main dimensions; object of 
obedience, partisanship and anonymity. Based on these three 
dimensions three ideal types (Weber, 1949) of value patterns 
labelled neutral, responsive and trustee have been identified (Table 
1). Each pattern offers a benchmark against which actual behaviour 
of AMs is analysed. 
 
In the context of ideal types (Table 1), neutral public managers obey 
the law and their political superiors conditional upon the latter 
acting within the law (Armstrong, 1989, Quinlan, 1993). They are 
non-partisan, ‘party neutral’ but not ‘politically neutered’ (Uhr, 
1987: 22) in their dealings with political superiors. Neutrality implies 
a division of role between public managers and political superiors, 
where public managers participate in the policy process by 
providing honest and frank advice. In doing so they take into 
account the goals of political superiors, the policy merits and the 
public interest. Public managers may vary in adopting neutrality 
values. Some may actively persuade politicians to adopt their 
recommendations while others may consider their task finished 
with the provision of advice (Keating, 1990). They faithfully 
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implement lawful policies and instructions decided by political 
superiors, even if they do not agree with them (Heclo, 1975; Spann, 
1973; Thompson, 1985). In this relationship public managers are 
anonymous; they do not make public comments or divulge 
information except with proper authorisation from or on behalf of 
their political superiors (Williams, 1985; Kernaghan, 1976). 
 
Table 1: Dimension and pattern of ideal type behaviour 
Dimensions Patterns 

























Public managers following the “trustee” value-pattern see society 
or the public as the ultimate object of obedience. They are non-
partisan in relation to political parties but see themselves as ‘non-
elected trustees’ of the sovereign power. They exercise that power 
‘with special sensitivity to the public interest’ (Buchanan, 1975: 
426). Trustees serve their superiors so long as the latter work for 
the public interest (Jackson, 1988: 247). They promote the public 
interest in their advice, only implement policies consistent with the 
public interest and resist policies that are not. Their resistance 
includes speaking out leaking information, whistle blowing and even 
secret white-anting from within if necessary (Jackson, 1988).  
 
Responsive public managers also obey their political superiors but 
do not confine themselves ‘to the letter and spirit of existing law’. 
They are ‘committed believers who would go about doing whatever 
was necessary to achieve *their superiors’+ policy goals’ (Aberbach 
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and Rockman, 1994: 466). Responsive public managers provide 
advice and information that support their superiors' policy 
objectives and might suppress adverse information and even ‘cook’ 
data to further the interests of their superiors (Rourke, 1992: 545). 
It follows that responsive public managers eschew anonymity and 
would not hesitate to make public comments and manage 
information to increase support for the policies and goals of their 
superiors. This describes a public manager who agrees with 
ideologies of their political superiors and responds to the unlawful 
demands of politicians on their own volition. Studies of public 
managers in Malaysia suggested that there could be a variation in 
responsive behaviour (Haidar et al 2004). In this situation council 
officers respond to the unreasonable demands of councillors only 
under pressure not on their own volition. They may give in to the 
pressures of politicians but only reluctantly. 
 
Politicisation in the context of public management has multiple 
meanings (Weller, 1989). This paper argues that politicisation 
occurs when elected members influence the human resource 
management dimensions of the employment relationship (ER) of 
council employees or managers. 
 
Method of data collection and sample 
 
The employment relationship of AMs has been assessed in terms of 
seven human resource dimensions: appointment, promotion, 
disciplinary matters, remuneration, training and development, 
reappointment, and performance evaluation. The responses of EMs 
were collected on a five point Likert type scale that ranged from not 
influential, to very influential. The section relating to values has 
been assessed in terms of the three dimensions and the four 
patterns developed reflecting all three dimensions.  The conceptual 
framework identifies three main patterns and, based on our 
Malaysian studies (Haidar et al 2004), an added variation in our 
responsive pattern was identified. The responses of EMs were 
collected on a five point Likert type scale that ranged from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. Responses of EMs were collected on two 
aspects of managerial behaviour: their preference and their 
experience. The experience aspect assessed values EMs believe 
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actually guide the behaviour of AMs and the preference aspect 
assessed values EMs believe should guide their behaviour. 
 
There are 85 local authorities in New Zealand and we have selected 
19 of them, based on a combination of factors that makes them 
representative of the sector as a whole. Factors that were 
considered include size, population, rural/urban mix, rate of growth 
and location. The Web pages of each organisation were accessed 
for the names and contact information of their EMs and 247 EMs 
were subsequently identified. The questionnaire was sent to all 247 
EMs. Of these, 95 completed forms were returned which equates to 
a response rate of 38.5 percent. This rate is considered satisfactory 




This section presents the responses of EMs in two parts. The first 
part presents results regarding the question whether employment 
relationship of NZ AMs is politicised or not. The second part 
presents their preferences and experiences regarding values that 
they believe should guide and actually guide the actions of AMs.  
 
Politicisation 
Table 2 presents responses of EMs about the level of influence they 
currently have over the employment matters of AMs.  The 
responses of EMs were collected on a five point Likert type scale 
that ranged from not influential, somewhat influential, influential, 
very influential, decisive and don’t know. For the purpose of 
simplicity, this paper presents the responses in three categories, not 
influential, influential and don’ know. The ‘influential’ category 
included responses in the categories of somewhat influential, 
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Table 2: Views of EMs about their influence on ER of AMs 
 Not  influential Influential Don’t know 
Appointments  50.0 47.8 2.2 
Promotions  56.8 39.8 3.4 
Disciplinary 
matters  
57.3 40.4 2.2 








46.6 64.8 1.1 
Performance 
evaluation  
38.2 60.6 1.1 
 
Under the current LGA 2002 EMs in New Zealand are empowered to 
control the employment relationship of the Chief Executives (CE). 
The CE in turn controls the employment matters of other senior 
managers. The Table 1 clearly shows that majority of EMs are not 
only influential in the HR dimensions of the CEs but they are also 
influential in the employment matters of the senior managers as 
well. The percentage of EMs who perceive that they have influence 
over the employment matters of AMs ranges from 38.2 to 64.8.  
 
Managerial values 
The responses of EMs on managerial values were collected on a five 
point Likert type scale that ranged from strongly disagree, disagree, 
agree and strongly agree and undecided. For the purpose of 
simplicity, this paper presents the responses in three categories, 
disagree, agree and undecided. Agree category includes agree and 
strongly agree while disagree category includes strongly disagree 
and disagree. 
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Table 3: Managerial values preferred and experienced by EMs 
Trustee Disagree Undecided Agree 
Preference Experience Preference Experience Preference Experience 
T1. make unauthorised public 
comment about council policies they 
believe are not in the community 
interest 
88.4 81.1 3.2 5.3 8.4 13.7 
T2. Disclose unauthorised 
information when they believe it is 
in the community interest to do so. 
84.2 80.7 5.3 7.5 10.6 11.8 
T3. Only implement council policies 
they believe are in the community 
interest. 
83.0 69.2 2.1 13.8 14.9 17.0 
T4. Only consider the community 
interest when providing policy 
advice to council. 
68.1 70.2 3.2 9.6 28.7 20.2 
T5. Having provided their policy 
advice, actively persuade elected 
members to adopt 
recommendations that, in their 
view, best serves community 
interest. 
66.6 48.9 6.5 9.6 26.9 41.5 
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Neutral Disagree Undecided Agree 
 Preference Experience Preference Experience Preference Experience 
N1. Never make unauthorised public 
comment about council policies, 
even if they believe the policies are 
against the community interest. 
23.4 35.1 7.4 8.5 69.1 56.4 
N2. Never make unauthorised 
disclosure of official information. 
24.2 24.2 2.1 11.6 73.7 64.2 
N3. Implement all lawful council 
policies, even if they believe these 
policies are against the community 
interest. 
16 19 7.4 7.4 76.6 73.7 
N4. Consider both the community 
interest and the political interests of 
elected members when providing 
policy advice to council. 
45.8 39.4 2.1 7.4 52.1 53.2 
N5. Having provided their policy 
advice, leave elected members alone 
to accept or reject their advice. 
13.8 24.5 00 9.6 86.1 66 
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Reluctant Responsive Disagree Undecided Agree 
 Preference Experience Preference Experience Preference Experience 
RR1. Make unauthorised public 
comments when they are under 
pressure from elected members to 
do so. 
94.6 84.1 4.3 8.5 1.1 7.4 
RR2. Disclose unauthorised 
information when they are under 
pressure from elected members to 
do so. 
90.4 81.9 6.4 11.6 3.2 6.4 
RR3. Implement unlawful requests 
from elected members when they 
are under pressure from elected 
members to do so. 
97.9 84 00 6.4 2.2 9.5 
RR4. Frame and limit their policy 
advice to suit the political interests 
of elected members when they are 
under pressure from elected 
members to do so. 
97.9 68.4 1.1 11.6 1.1 20 
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Proactive responsive Disagree Undecided Agree 
 Preference Experience Preference Experience Preference Experience 
PR1. Make unauthorised public 
comment in support of the political 
interests of elected members. 
100 85.3 00 6.3 00 8.4 
PR2. Disclose unauthorised 
information in support of the 
political interests of elected 
members. 
100 86.3 00 8.4 00 5.3 
PR3. Only implement policies that 
promote the political interests of 
elected members. 
93.7 88.3 3.2 5.3 3.2 6.4 
PR4. Frame and limit their policy 
advice to suit the political interests 
of elected members. 
 
95.8 79 1.1 10.5 3.2 10.6 
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A number of findings stand out very clearly from Table 3. EMs 
prefer AMs to act as neutral managers: A large majority of them 
prefer AMs to act neither as trustees nor as hired guns. Preferences 
about the managerial values of a large number of EMs match with 
their experiences. A large majority of EMs prefer AMs not to act as 
trustees and nor do the AMs wish to act as trustees. EMs do not 
want AMs to act as the saviour of the community interest and, by 
and large, managers are not viewed by EMs acting as the saviour of 
the community interest either. In others words, there is very little 
gap between the preferences and experiences of a large majority of 
EMs regarding the role of AMs in the trustee pattern. Neither do 
councillors prefer appointed managers to be responsive. This is 
matched by the actual behaviour of AMs. Most EMs do not believe 
that AMs are responsive, whether on their own volition nor under 
pressure. AMs are not seen acting as hired guns by councillors. The 
majority of AMs do no not adopt responsive values despite EMs 
saying that the employment relationship of AMs is politicised. EMs 
prefer AMs to act as neutral public servants. Experiences of most 
EMs supports what they prefer on the neutrality pattern. Having 
said that, however, it appears that there are some gaps in the 
preferences and the experiences of EMs in terms of some of the 
values adopted by AMs.  
 
On the trustee pattern, it is clear that on most items there is not 
much gap between the preferences and experiences of EMs. More 
than 80 percent of the EMs believe that AMs should neither disclose 
information nor should they make public comment about council 
policies. Nor should they drag their feet in implementing policies 
even if they believe that the policy does not serve the community 
interest. By and large expectations are matched by the experiences 
of EMs on these items. However, preferences and experiences of 
EMs vary with regard to managerial advice.  While over 28 percent 
of EMs prefer that community interest should be the only 
consideration in managerial advice; only around 20 percent of EMs 
perceive that community interest should be major consideration in 
managerial advice. In other words, more EMs prefer AMs to focus 
mostly on community interest in their advice but EMs are reporting 
that AMs include other elements in their advice. These responses 
are quite consistent and seem to support responses of EMs in the 
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responsive pattern and the neutrality pattern (see below). On the 
trustee pattern, the more glaring gap between the preferences and 
experiences of EMs is on the last item i.e. T5. While more than 41 
percent of EMs perceive that AMs keep on persuading EMs to 
accept their advice, only 26 percent of EMs believe that officers 
should do so.  The most glaring gap appears to be in the areas of 
managerial advice. This theme runs through the most of the 
responses of the EMs. Let us pursue a few of them.  
 
On the neutrality pattern, there is very little gap between the 
preferences and experiences of EMs in terms of the value adopted 
by AMs except for the last item i.e. N5. While little over 86 percent 
of EMs believe that a manager’s job finishes with providing the 
advice and that they should leave EMs alone to accept or reject 
their advice; only 66 percent of EMs believe that AMs do so. In 
other words there is big gap between the preferences and 
experiences of EMs. More, EMs prefer to be left alone but officers 
do not leave them alone. There is a consistency in the behaviours of 
AMs which, according to these results, EMs do not like. We have 
already mentioned that on a similar question in the trustee pattern 
almost half of the EMs responding to our survey believe that 
officers do not leave them alone.   
 
By and large, responses from EMs show that they do not want AMs 
to be responsive, whether on their own volition or under pressure. 
These preferences of EMs match with their experience. EMs, by and 
large, do not perceive that AMs are responsive neither on their own 
volition nor under pressure from EMs.  On the reluctant responsive 
pattern, on most items, there is very little gap between the 
preferences and experiences on the behaviour of AMs except one 
which is consistent with other responses of EMs. Most EMs prefer 
AMs not to tailor their advice to suit the political interest of 
councillors but 20 percent EMs believe that AMs do so under 
pressure. A little over 10 percent of EMs believe that AMs tailor 





   




Findings from this study show that although elected members (EM) 
are not supposed to influence employment matters of appointed 
managers (AM) other than the CEs, they actually are influential over 
the employment matters of senior managers. We have found that 
CEs on their own volition, seek advice from the elected members on 
the employment matters of senior managers because the latter 
work closely with the former. As one elected member says: “As an 
elected member I have been involved with the appointment of 
CEOs but fully understand it is the CEO’s job to appoint and deal 
with all employment matters. However, sometimes I have been 
asked by the CEO for my opinion regarding staff”. This shows 
similarity to our findings from the Gippsland regions in Victoria, 
Australia. We have argued that senior manager employment in the 
local government units in Gippsland is a concurrent jurisdiction 
(Pullin and Haidar, 1999). 
 
Most EMs report that under a politicised employment relationship, 
managers adopt neither the responsive values nor the trustee 
values: Most EMs report that AMs adopt neutral values which is 
what ruling politicians prefer. They prefer managers to adopt 
neutral rather than responsive values or the trustee values in their 
actions. EMs prefer managers to act neither as unelected trustee of 
community interests nor as their hired guns. The preferences of 
EMs, however, vary from their experiences on the issue of 
managerial advice across all three patterns identified in this study.  
While more than 41 percent of EMs find that AMs keep on 
persuading EMs to accept their advice only 26 percent of EMs 
prefer AMs to do so.  While little over 86 percent of EMs believe 
that a manager’s job finishes with providing the advice and they 
should leave EMs alone to accept or reject their advice; only 66 
percent of EMs believe that AMs do so in practice. These results 
suggest that a there are AMs who, a sizeable percentage of EMs 
believe, adopt and prefer to adopt the role of trustees. Most EMs 
prefer AMs not to adopt responsive values in their advice but 20 
percent EMs believe that AMs do so under pressure. A little over 10 
percent of EMs believe that AMs adopt responsive values in their 
advice on their own volition. These results suggest that although 
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most AMs adopt neutrality values, there are managers in NZ local 
government who adopt trustee and reluctant responsive values as 
well while providing advice.   
 
AMs adopt neutrality values even working under a politicised 
employment for a variety of reasons. The neutrality ethic is a 
prudent principle from the self-interest perspective of government 
managers. A manager with neutrality orientation can hold on to a 
job longer than a responsive manager or a trustee, as the neutral 
manager can continue working for many political groups while a 
responsive manager or a trustee can only work for a political group 
that agrees with his or her views and attitudes. Neutrality as an 
ideal is "more understandable and functional for career executives 
than other ideals such as 'public service' or 'public interest'" 
(Maranto and Skelley, 1992, 184). Neutral managers by distancing 
themselves from identification with any particular group can 
“preserve their reputation for indispensable competence and 
fairness" (Caiden, 1996, 21). The neutrality ethic, as Caiden argued, 
also fits in with certain personality types and for them it has 
remained a ‘beguiling idea’. Principles of neutrality ethic fit very 
well with people who prefer not to take risks, hate practical politics 
and yet desire comfort, security, and upward mobility (Caiden, 
1996, 22-23). 
 
EMs prefer managers ho adopt neutral values because this set of 
values recognises the distribution of power between managers and 
politicians (Maranto and Skelley, 1992; Helco, 1977). In local 
government, EMs are invested with power and AMs exercise power 
delegated to them by councillors. This distribution of power 
recognises the fact that Ems, as representatives, formulate policies 
and remain accountable to their electors for their actions. This 
accountability requires, among others, that policies and strategies 
are adopted and implemented that reflect the wishes of the 
electors. It is quite natural that EMs would like to have a advice that 
they are comfortable with and that reflects the wishes of their 
electors.  
 
A sizeable percentage of EMs report that some managers adopt 
trustee values in their advice. Such EMs in NZ believe that managers 
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adopt this behaviour because they do not like to accept the 
distribution of power in the area of managerial advice.  As one EM 
says: “Elected members are decision makers having been elected to 
control the direction of local authorities. Some managers are apt to 
take on a political role which causes conflict between them and 
elected members”.  Another EM supports this view: “I believe the 
key problem in my experience in local government is management 
not providing sound advice to council and then not implementing 
decisions the management and staff do not agree. The real 
battlefield is between elected member and management/staff”. 
Some councillors seem to believe that managers push them to 
accept their advice because they want to serve their own interest 
rather than the community’s interests. As one EM says: 
“Administration uses its power to enlighten or darken policy issues 
to suit their needs most times, not elected members or public”.  It 
must be noted however that managers may, in pushing councillors 
to accept their advice, be motivated by a belief that EMs work for 
parochial political interest rather than community interests.  
 
A small percentage of EMs, believe that there are AMs in NZ local 
government who adopt responsive values in their advice. Almost 
one fifth of EMs believe that AMs adopt responsive values in their 
advice under pressure. This finding supports the common 
assumption that under a politicised employment managers are 
likely to politicise their advice for fear of losing their jobs. We have 
also found that one tenth of EMs believe that some AMs adopt 
responsive values in their advice on their own volition. This study 
found that EMs influence the appointment, reappointment not only 
of CEs but also of most AMs. It is possible that EMs through their 
influence over the selection and appointment process ensures that 




In a rare study of ruling politicians in the New Zealand local 
government this study found that working under politicised 
employment conditions government managers in their behaviour 
combine neutrality values with elements from trustee and 
responsive values. These findings thus indicate that the traditional 
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role distribution between politicians and managers needs 
reconsideration. The challenge is to ensure provision of impartial 
advice from managers working under politicised employment 
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As the globalisation of markets continues at a rapid pace, the 
challenges for HR managers and those teaching HR increase. 
Human Resource Management practices vary between countries, 
sector, size and ownership of organizations. As a result it is 
important to acknowledge that what are largely considered to be 
‘Western’ style HRM practices may not be relevant in other 
cultures. Despite this, some lessons may be learned from 
organizational experiences that can be transferred across countries 
and cultures through globalisation.  
 
Globalisation is used to define a combination of factors - a single 
market place with growing free trade among nations; the 
increasing flow and sharing of information; and connections and 
opportunities for organisations and people to interact around the 
world without being constrained by national boundaries. To date 
globalisation has been a prime force for spreading knowledge 
through technology. Knowledge about production methods, 
management techniques, export markets, and economic policies is 
available at very low cost, and this knowledge represents a valuable 
resource for both developed and developing countries.  It has been 
suggested that the HRD profession must include not only economic 
development and workplace learning, but it must also be 
committed to the political, social, environmental, cultural, and 
spiritual development of people around the world, particularly, as 
global success depends on utilizing the resources and diverse 
talents and capabilities of the broadest possible spectrum of 
humanity.  
 
This conference draws from the research and experiences of 
participants to provide lessons and examples regarding how some 
organizations and individuals are attempting to utilise HRM 
strategies in order to promote agility and excellence and, in some 
cases, globalise business through such diverse topics as: 
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